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Visions of prosperity and conspiracy in Timor-Leste 
Judith Bovensiepen 
Abstract: In Timor-Leste, visions of radical societal transformation and future 
wealth derived from gold and oil are accompanied by concerns that outsiders 
might be conspiring to rob the country of its riches, as well as conjuring up dysto-
pian scenarios of sinister plots and future mayhem. Examining national narratives 
and local accounts, this article argues that visions of prosperity and visions of con-
spiracy are two sides of the same coin; both are embedded in an understanding 
that power works in invisible ways. In discussing these visions in relation to the 
literature on “conspiracy theories” and “cargo cults” (terms that have recently been 
imported to the study of Timor-Leste), it explores the critical potential of these 
visions. Whereas the labels “conspiracy theory” and “cargo cult” create distinc-
tions between the “rational” perspective of the West and the “irrationality” of non-
Western others, as practices these visions end up collapsing such distinctions by 
appropriating the power of the outside. 
Keywords: cargo cults, conspiracy theories, critiques of power, occult cosmologies, 
the politics of oil 
In 1987–1988, the Portuguese-Timorese priest 
Jorge Barros Duarte identii ed three “nativist 
movements” in East Timor, arguing that these 
had “cargoistic” elements. h e movements com-
bined Christian with “nativist” practices and 
were critical of the status quo, thus advancing “a 
vision of a new society and a new life” (Duarte 
1987–1988: 51). h e priest was not the only one 
who speculated about the existence of “cargo 
cults” in East Timor. When in 2011 the East Ti-
morese government (by then independent from 
Indonesia) launched the Strategic Development 
Plan, which contained plans for a massive pe-
troleum development project along the south 
coast of the country, several “internationals” 
working for the aid industry in the country lik-
ened these plans to a cargo cult. Australia is still 
today making claims to oil and gas reserves in 
the Timor Sea, which according to international 
maritime law belong to Timo r-Leste. Plans for 
an onshore petroleum infrastructure on the 
south coast are explicitly part of Timor-Leste’s 
struggle for national sovereignty, since Australia 
refused to settle on permanent maritime boun -
daries and pushed Timor-Leste into a resource-
sharing agreement. 
When Timor-Leste regained independence 
in 2002, the anthropological fascination with 
the diverse range of phenomena (mainly in 
Melanesia) labeled falsely or not as “cargo cults” 
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had already peaked and waned. At er an initial 
proliferation of writing on the subject in the 
1950s and 1960s (and resurgences in the 1970s 
and 1980s), the contested label “cargo cult,” 
invented in 1945, had been largely discredited 
(Jebens 2004: 1–2). Not only does it import neg-
ative connotations of “irrationality,” but it also 
exaggerates the dif erences between “Melane-
sia” and “the West” (Hermann 2004). Further-
more the label was seen to misrepresent what 
was actually happening in Melanesia and came 
to be seen as ideologically suspect (Robbins 
2004: 243). In light of such discreditation, the 
aim of this article is not to establish whether or 
not there are cargo cults in Timor-Leste. Nev-
ertheless, it seeks to take seriously the hopes 
for social change that are expressed by people 
whose ideas have been described as “cargoistic,” 
by which I mean the “visions of prosperity” that 
are a vital motivating force behind present-day 
development in the country. 
h ese ideas about prosperity labeled as “car-
goistic” are ot en linked to rumors about con-
spiracy. When internal conl icts broke out in 
Timor-Leste in 2006, for example, there were 
widespread rumors that foreigners, specii cally 
Australians or Indonesians, were meddling with 
national politics, seeking to oust the let -wing 
FRETILIN government in order to put econom-
ically liberal rivals into power, prompting media 
reports about let -wing “conspiracy theories” 
(e.g. Aarons 2006). Across Timor-Leste, visions 
of radical societal transformation and future 
wealth derived from gold or oil are frequently 
accompanied by concerns that outsiders might 
be conspiring to rob the country of its riches. 
Labeling such concerns “conspiracy theories” is 
also a way of trying to invalidate criticisms of 
foreign intervention. 
h is article explores utopian visions of pros-
perity in relation to dystopian visions that ex-
press suspicions about sinister plots, as well as 
conjuring up scenarios of future mayhem, war, 
or foreign exploitation. Examining national nar-
ratives and local accounts, I argue that visions 
of prosperity and visions of conspiracy are two 
sides of the same coin; both are embedded in 
an understanding of the invisible workings of 
power, both are critiques of power and attempts 
to appropriate it. h e conjoining of these phe-
nomena at an empirical level also allows me to 
link them analytically—using insights from an-
thropological debates about the contested label 
“cargo cult” to think about certain aspects in 
the literature on “conspiracy theories” and vice 
versa. 
h is article distinguishes between, on the 
one hand, the labels “cargo cult” and “conspir-
acy theory,” and on the other hand, the prac-
tices of envisioning prosperity and conspiracy. 
To make this distinction it draws on Pelkmans 
and Machold’s (2011) argument that there is 
a dif erence between labeling a certain idea a 
conspiracy theory, and the practice of theoriz-
ing about conspiracies. Labeling and theorizing 
are frequently carried out from dif erent posi-
tions in a i eld of power. Pelkmans and Machold 
(2011: 67, 77) stress that conspiracy theory la-
bels tend to be produced by people in positions 
of power and are “a tool for those in control” 
because such labels are used to discredit those 
suspicious of power. By contrast, “conspiracy 
theorizing,” they argue (2011: 77), is a means “to 
render an inexplicable world comprehensible,” 
and thereby “challenge real conspiracies.” 
h e same might be said about the label “cargo 
cults.” Just like the label “conspiracy theory,” the 
term “cargo cult” can be used to present peo-
ple as irrational, counter-productive, or entirely 
other, thereby reproducing the marginalization 
of those to whom such labels apply and open-
ing them up to ridicule. It depends on who is 
using such labels. I thus propose to distinguish 
between the label “cargo cult” and the practice 
of envisioning radical societal transformation, 
as these practices stem from very dif erent po-
sitions in a i eld of power. 
h e research on which this article is based 
draws on over thirty months of i eldwork be-
tween 2005 and 2015 in three dif erent localities in 
Timor-Leste: in Laclubar (the central highlands), 
Suai-Covalima (the south coast), and the cap-
ital city Dili. h e Indonesian military had oc-
cupied the half-island of East Timor for nearly 
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a quarter of a century (1975–1999), taking ad-
vantage of the political instabilities of the de-
colonization process, when national parties and 
an independence movement were developing 
in the former Portuguese colony. h e country 
regained independence in 2002 and is now of-
i cially referred to as “h e Democratic Republic 
of Timor-Leste.” 
Visions of prosperity
Since 2011, the East Timorese government has 
been initiating a variety of gigantic develop-
ment projects. h ese include a massive onshore 
petroleum infrastructure project, the Tasi Mane 
petroleum corridor, and special economic zones 
in the enclave of Oecussi and on the island of 
Atauro (Meitzner Yoder 2015). h e plans for 
these projects—including computer-generated 
videos and photographs of artii cially designed 
cities, a modern six-lane highway, and new air-
ports—have been circulated across the country 
and raise intense hopes and expectations among 
the population. Several research participants 
told me that they thought that in 10 or 20 years, 
Timor-Leste would look like Portugal, Singa-
pore, Australia, or Indonesia (see Bovensiepen, 
Filipe, and Freitas forthcoming). One may say 
that the utopian hopes for radical societal trans-
formation once associated with independence 
(Nygaard-Christensen 2010), are now associ-
ated with oil wealth. As Bubandt (2004) has said 
in relation to his research in Maluku (Halmat-
era), modernity is its very own cargo cult with 
millenarian elements. Along similar lines the 
Australian academic James Scambary (personal 
communication) has argued that the ideology of 
neoliberalism could be seen as a cargo cult. To 
counter representations of East Timorese as car-
goistic, the Timorese politician Fidelis Magal-
hães (personal communication) has suggested 
that the UN transitional government in East 
Timor that governed the country from 1999 to 
2002 could also be seen as a kind of cargo cult, 
as it promised radical societal transformation to 
prosperity through democratisation.
Hopes of rapid prosperity cannot just be 
found at the national level but were also vivid 
during my research in the coastal area of Suai-
Covalima and the highlands of the Laclubar 
subdistrict. With the onslaught of the Indone-
sian occupation in 1975, and during the violent 
interactions between East Timorese political 
parties that preceded it, the inhabitants of the 
rural areas of Laclubar were forcibly displaced: 
in the mid- to late 1970s, the Indonesian mili-
tary resettled residents from the village of Fu-
nar in Laclubar Town. In the mid- to late 1990s, 
at er nearly two decades of forced exile, many 
of them returned to their ancestral lands, where 
they have since actively sought to rebuild their 
place of origin. When the villagers returned to 
their ancestral land, a number of them main-
tained that they are the potential owners of 
marvelous riches—and that they will realize 
ownership if they achieve the appropriate rela-
tionship with their ancestral landscape. Some 
argued that an abundance of gold lies beneath 
the ancestral sites or is stored inside ancestral 
houses; indeed, some told stories of how during 
ancestral times, golden discs would hover over 
the land. To re-create such wealth today, ac-
cording to this view, ancestral relations must be 
reinvigorated not only by moving back to the 
ancestral land but through ritual reinauguration 
of ancestral houses and places—conspiring with 
invisible forces would usher in a time of wealth 
and prosperity. 
h is connection between wealth, the land, 
and the ancestors was a central topic in many 
narratives. Some of them recount the encounters 
of former rulers with a golden star, something 
which resonates both with biblical accounts of 
a guiding star, as well as with the Morning Star 
associated with independence in West Papua 
(Rutherford 2003). In Laclubar, the golden star 
is described as the embodiment of lulik land, 
lulik being a term frequently translated as “sa-
cred,” “forbidden,” or “potent”—a potency that 
is seen as distinctly indigenous and associated 
with the ancestors and with the underground. 
Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere, in ances-
tral narratives gold is a metonym for lulik (Bov-
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ensiepen 2015). It is through the mobilization 
and help of this lulik potency that ancestral rul-
ers are said to have gained independence from 
neighboring regions. 
h e association between lulik and gold is 
also clear from more contemporary accounts. 
One man told me for example that during the 
Indonesian occupation he had found a small 
piece of gold, the size of a peanut, in his pocket. 
At er that, he started traveling in his dreams: he 
would l y around and into the mountains near 
Laclubar Town and in the morning he would 
wake up near the lulik site. He was very fright-
ened by these unwanted journeys, and so he 
tried to throw the gold away, but it kept on re-
appearing in his pocket. h is account echoes an 
oral tradition about the ruler of Laclubar (Dom 
Geraldo), who “gained independence” from the 
neighboring domain by descending into an un-
derground tunnel inside a lulik mountain. Inde-
pendence, here, is associated not just with gold 
in the shape of a star but also with the under-
ground. My friend’s unwanted travels through 
the underground, triggered by the piece of gold, 
is similarly a way in which he gains access to a 
realm thus far unfamiliar to him; dreams make 
this aspect visible and allow him—albeit against 
his will—access to unknown aspects of life. 
h ere were other related narratives that men-
tioned gold. A member of the ruling house in 
Laclubar Town told me in secret, and with an ex-
pression of wonder, that when his origin house 
was inaugurated recently, a cloud of golden stars 
fell from the sky. He also maintained that the 
British monarchy had i nanced the construc-
tion of his origin house. Comparable claims 
have been made by political leaders in the cap-
ital city, Dili. h e leader of the Timor’s People’s 
Party (PPT), Jacob Xavier, contended that his 
lulik house was Buckingham Palace and that gold 
from Timor’s lulik houses was stolen to establish 
the World Bank (Kammen 2009: 398). 
It is a common feature of these accounts that 
the source of prosperity is associated with the 
land (and more specii cally the underground) 
and with ancestral houses. h ese houses, which 
are units of identii cation and social organiza-
tion, are divided into foreign and indigenous 
houses, representing the political and ritual 
spheres respectively. h e members of the au-
tochthonous houses, which are called “the 
guardians/people of the land,” claim that their 
ancestors emerged directly from the land. Be-
cause the land is thought to have given birth 
to the primordial ancestors, it is considered to 
be the “trunk,” “origin,” or “center” of life. I was 
also told that humanity descends from a lulik 
site in Laclubar Town, called Balulin. h is place, 
marked by a hole in the ground, is considered to 
be the birthplace of the i rst human ancestors, 
who are sometimes referred to as Adam and 
Eve. One man told me that the Virgin Mary was 
actually born in Laclubar, where she was trans-
formed from a civet cat into a human being.
h e notion of a primordial unity between 
humans and the land is crucial to understand-
ing the ways in which people of the region see 
themselves and their relations to others (both 
ancestors and foreigners). One of the most strik-
ing aspects in the accounts of their return to Fu-
nar is the way villagers say that they need to be 
close to their ancestral land in order to recover 
well-being and prosperity. Wealth can be ob-
tained by mobilizing the potency of the land, of 
ancestral objects and houses. h e detail of such 
mobilization is usually kept secret—those mak-
ing such claims present themselves as conspir-
ing with invisible powers. Yet, being too close to 
or unii ed with the ancestral land can also cause 
anxiety and there was ot en a lingering fear that 
outsiders could threaten indigenous sources of 
prosperity. 
h e suggestion that there is a secret and 
empowering source of prosperity and that the 
control over this source has either been lost or 
is under threat is also a central theme in many 
places in Melanesia. Hence a number of authors 
have suggested that we can describe Timor-Leste’s 
accounts as having cargoistic elements (Kam-
men 2009; Traube 2007; Duarte 1987–1988). 
However, although hopes and promises about 
sudden wealth are clearly expressed in the La-
clubar subdistrict, I found little evidence that 
these were linked specii cally to Western goods. 
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h is was somewhat dif erent in national narra-
tives of oil development that clearly sought to 
appeal to modernist aesthetics. In both kinds of 
accounts, the thet  of people’s source of prosper-
ity was associated with contact with foreigners 
and, at least in Laclubar, did not lead people to 
form a movement (millenarian or otherwise) 
to recover the wealth. How useful, then, is this 
comparison between visions of prosperity in 
Timor-Leste and the cargo literature? 
Locating any East Timorese/Melanesian phe-
nomenon in terms of cargo cults must take into 
account the reassessment of this category that 
has taken place over the last 30 years, in which 
cargo discourse has come to be seen in terms 
of the colonial context it served, providing 
“Europeans with a locally adapted version of a 
broader colonial myth of indigenous irrational-
ity or counter-productivity” (Buck 1989: 160) 
or as the product of Western desires (Lindstrom 
1993) and generally to be understood in the con-
text of colonial, missionary and early anthro-
pological discourses aimed at constituting and 
exaggerating the dichotomy between the colo-
nial Self and the indigenous Other (Hermann 
2004: 38). h e label “cargo cult” reinforced these 
dif erences, similar to Pelkmans and Machold’s 
(2011) description of the label “conspiracy the-
ory,” which establishes a distinction between 
rational theories of the powerful and the sup-
posed irrationality of the powerless. h e dangers 
of continuing to use “cargo” as a category and ap-
plying it to Timor-Leste risks, on the one hand, 
perpetuating derogatory/romantic exoticization, 
casting Timorese ideas as irrational and, on the 
other hand, overextending the category analyt-
ically such that the phenomena labeled “cargo 
cults” in Melanesia are so vast that the term loses 
any explanatory value (Buck 1989: 157; Otto 
1999: 88). 
For all that, others have argued that, recon-
i gured, the term captures practices that cannot 
be ignored (e.g., Lattas 1998; Tabani 2008), and 
these connect to what I observed in Timor-Leste. 
One undeniable ethnographic point of connec-
tion is the implicit interweaving of biblical ac-
counts into the narratives about future prosper-
ity, one example of which was the golden star 
that showed the i rst ancestors the way. Sim-
ilarly the claims about the origins of human-
ity and the renaming of the i rst ancestors as 
Adam and Eve bears some resemblance to the 
way that Melanesian accounts draw on the Bi-
ble. Jorge Barros Duarte described “Hoho-Ulu” 
in Aileu as the “oldest nativist movement” in 
Timor-Leste, in existence since the later part of 
the nineteenth century (Duarte 1987–1988: 45). 
Connecting Catholicism with “popular local tra-
ditions” (Duarte 1987–1988: 47), the movement 
had its own “little Jesus” (a Timorese boy) and 
a Virgin Mary (Nossa Senhora), who was said 
to have been able to transform a kernel of corn 
into a mound of maize: hence, Duarte argued, 
the Hoho-Ulu movement had cargoistic ele-
ments (1987–1988: 45).
During her i eldwork in Hohul and Raimaus 
among the Mambai of Timor-Leste in the 1970s 
and again at er the restoration of independence, 
Elizabeth Traube (2007) recorded narratives 
about a Christ-like prophet, called Tat Felis, who 
would have brought prosperity and justice to lo-
cal people had the ancestors not foolishly driven 
him away (she may be speaking about the same 
movement described by Duarte). h e possi-
bility of undoing this mistake of the ancestors 
was connected to utopian hopes of what would 
be gained from independence, leading Traube 
(2007: 10) to stress the nationalist potential of 
these accounts and comparing them to “so-
called ‘cargo myths.’” h is theme of blocked ac-
cess makes an interesting connection between 
Timor-Leste and the millenarian movement of 
Kaliai in Papua New Guinea, which sees its ac-
cess to cargo as blocked because of mistakes its 
“heathen” ancestors made in colonial times that 
“damaged their relationships with the under-
ground dead” (Lattas 1998: 98). In Lattas’s and 
Traube’s work we i nd that people identify with 
the suf ering of Jesus in order to make sense of 
inequalities in the present (Lattas 1998: xxxiv–
xxxi), preparing the ground for nationalist mo-
bilization (see Lattas 1998: xxvvii–xxxi; and 
Tabani 2008: 332–35, who discuss whether 
cargo cults are proto-nationalist formations; 
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see also Worsley 1957). In Laclubar, hopes about 
future prosperity were not specii cally associ-
ated with independence and nationalist sen-
timents, as they were in other areas of Timor-
Leste (Nygaard-Christensen 2010). In Funar, 
prosperity would be achieved through reunii -
cation with the ancestral land—similar to the 
way Kiliai in Lattas’s ethnography sought pros-
perity—albeit within a nationalist framework—
by regaining control over the underground world 
of the dead that the whites had somehow man-
aged to colonize and keep separate from the liv-
ing (Lattas 1998: 110). 
In “Fragments of Utopia,” Douglas Kammen 
describes dif erent types of “utopian visions” that 
have characterized political thinking in Timor-
Leste since independence, including “myth(s) 
of great subterranean riches” (2009: 405). Kam-
men (2009: 400) discusses a range of dif erent 
groups in Timor-Leste, whose ideas may be de-
scribed as millenarian, merging political and re-
ligious agendas. h ere is the antigovernment or-
ganization CPD-RDTL, a group called Kolimau 
2000 that has associated independence with a 
moment of radical transformation, and Sagrada 
Familia, founded by the guerilla i ghter L-7, 
which combines Catholic and ancestral notions 
of sacred power. h ese various groups mostly 
have their origins in the anti-Indonesian resis-
tance and bring together Catholic and indige-
nous notions of potency, expressing critiques of 
the postoccupation independent government. 
When I i rst arrived in the Laclubar subdis-
trict, some residents suggested that I had come 
to steal gold from ancestral houses. h e fear of 
“losing gold” might similarly represent people’s 
worries about outside interference in their con-
trol over local resources. h e fear that foreigners 
had come to Timor-Leste to steal their gold de-
posits is an inverse analogue of claims made in 
some of the Melanesian contexts that foreigners 
are regarded as the lost brother who has come to 
restore an age of unity at er the fragmentation 
of prosperity or power. In both cases, the rela-
tionship to invisible power that can be tapped 
into to bring prosperity draws on a distinction 
between self and other. h e “others” can be for-
eigners or colonizers—but also ancestors, as the 
literature on the notion of foreigners being re-
turning ancestors illustrates. 
Rutherford (2003) has shown how in West 
Papua, the foreign has come to be seen as a 
source of wealth, value, and desire, similar to 
Bubandt’s (2004) analysis of how in Maluku 
the outside is imagined as a vital source of lo-
cal identity. In contrast, in the Laclubar sub-
district—as elsewhere in Timor-Leste—we i nd 
the suggestion that even those who seem for-
eign may in fact be returning younger brothers. 
When characterizing the importance of the an-
cestral land, people emphasize that the land gave 
birth to the i rst human beings; it is the source 
or origin of life. h e suggestion that all of hu-
manity originates from this region implies that 
foreigners also originate there, thus collapsing 
the distinctions between indigenous people and 
outsiders. Again we i nd a point of connection to 
Melanesian cases, such as the Tuka movement, 
which not only mobilized the Fijian principle of 
the power of the people of the land but also held 
that the ancestors of all-powerful others are em-
placed in Fiji (Kaplan 2004: 60, 74). Similarly, in 
Timor-Leste foreigners are frequently associated 
with land spirits, which is the same term used 
for autochthones, “people of the land” (see also 
Hicks 2004 [1976]: 35–37). 
An underlying assumption is thus that there 
is an original unity of foreigners and autoch-
thones—bound up with the original unity of 
humans and the land. h is could explain why 
some East Timorese hold that the wealth of for-
eigners actually belongs to Timor-Leste, since 
both share a common origin (e.g., at Balulin, 
the “navel” of the land and origin place of hu-
mankind). While labels such as “cargo cult” and 
“conspiracy theory” reinforce dif erences be-
tween the self and others, such visions of com-
mon human origins end up collapsing these 
distinctions. By doing so, they operate as a cri-
tique of power dif erentials and social inequal-
ities that are implicit in such distinctions—by 
expressing dreams of millenarian change, peo-
ple stress they are equally deserving of modern 
lifestyles. 
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Lattas (1998: 103) describes how Melanesian 
Kaliai believe that it is whites who seek to keep 
them away from the source of wealth, devel-
oping a renewed interest in the underground 
in order to carve out a sphere not belonging to 
the Europeans. Reconi gured, this underground 
world of the dead became “a utopian realm of 
otherness that would allow people to remake 
themselves in ways that both mimed and were 
dif erent from those mimetic processes oi  cially 
authorized by Europeans” (Lattas 1998: 97). 
h rough ideas about the underground and the 
various associations of gold and oil, people in 
Timor-Leste too are creating a place to identify 
with the wealth and the visions of modernity 
of the other—creating a space where through 
something contained deep inside the land, Ti-
morese can be at least as prosperous as the for-
mer European colonizers. 
Visions of conspiracy 
Attitudes toward the invisible potency of the 
ancestral land are ambivalent, for it embodies 
both utopian and dystopian potentialities. For 
instance, the emphasis on hidden wealth, asso-
ciated with the underground or with ancestral 
actions, caused concern that foreigners could 
try to take this resource away, as mentioned 
earlier. h ese concerns were expressed not just 
toward me but also toward other outsiders. A 
member of Laclubar’s police force, for example, 
suggested that the US government had a spe-
cial interest in the region because of the oil re-
sources in Pualaka (near Laclubar Town). I also 
heard suggestions that the United States was 
plotting to invade Timor-Leste because of its 
immense uranium deposits that were allegedly 
located underground (see also Kammen 2009: 
389, 405). Several residents of Laclubar Town 
told me that the Peace Corps volunteers were 
actually CIA agents, which was visible in the 
fact that they owned big satellite phones. Kam-
men (personal communication) was similarly 
told by a lecturer at Dili’s National University 
that the United States of America was interested 
in building a naval base under Atauro, a former 
prison island north of Dili. A key theme here 
is the underground and the idea that foreign-
ers are somehow trying to control this sphere 
(cf. Scott 2011). By seeking to develop the island 
into a special economic zone, the East Timorese 
government seems to be reappropriating this 
space. h ose positive visions are countered by 
prevalent warnings by local nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), as well as international 
commentators and scholars, about oil depen-
dency and the dangers of the resource curse 
(for anthropological discussions of the resource 
curse, see, e.g., Reyna and Behrends 2008; Wesz-
kalnys 2011). Dystopian scenarios of oil depen-
dency present the l ipside of more aspirational 
visions of development from oil wealth. 
During my time in Timor-Leste, suspicions 
toward outsiders, suggestions about conspira-
cies, or worries about the possible onslaught of 
mayhem and war intensii ed during politically 
unstable times. During the 2007 elections, for 
example, there were rumors in Laclubar that 
members of the FRETILIN party were hiding 
sacks of rice in a secret deposit for distribu-
tion to their supporters alone. Several villag-
ers claimed to have heard gunshots during the 
night and alluded to the possibility of terrible 
and unspeakable things happening in the fu-
ture. On a number of occasions while discuss-
ing the tense political situation in the capital 
city Dili, friends in Funar told each other with 
a sense of panic to be quiet in case others might 
be listening. Such suspicion and mistrust were 
certainly connected to the experiences of Indo-
nesian occupation, when there was a constant 
and very real danger of people being accused of 
supporting the resistance and shots were indeed 
i red at night.
Rumors and suspicions contained both a 
realistic and a “dystopian” element. In 2006, 
violence erupted in the capital city Dili at er 
disagreements within the military led to more 
widespread regional conl icts, the collapse of the 
main state institutions, and an oi  cial request 
for the intervention of an international military 
peacekeeping force. During the so-called krise, 
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videos and photos by the rebel leader Alfredo 
Reinado were circulated throughout the coun-
try, which further fueled fears, rumors, and 
concerns about national conspiracies. People 
in Funar were convinced, for example, that Re-
inado was hiding nearby and the general anxiety 
was intensii ed by the fact that helicopters, sus-
pected to be carrying armed military personnel, 
were regularly l ying low over the village. During 
this period, people mentioned anxiously and on 
a near daily basis that they thought a very big 
war would break out—a war that would be un-
like anything they had experienced before. At 
the same time, there were rumors that a pig had 
given birth to an elephant. h e pig story was a 
topic of daily conversation—it expressed the to-
tal mayhem and disorder people were expect-
ing. h is, people said, was a “sign” that much 
worse was to come. In the same vein, a number 
of villagers claimed that the “h ree Lakes” (Tasi 
Tolu) near Dili had all turned blood red, a ru-
mor that originated in the capital city. For some, 
lakes i lled with blood were a sign of impending 
war and the return of unthinkable mayhem to 
Timor-Leste, while others reasoned that they 
represented terrible massacres that had already 
happened in the context of the 2006 conl icts. 
Maj Nygaard-Christensen (2012: 222–223) 
has examined the perception of Reinado as the 
“rebel” leader, opposed to that of the “diplomat” 
José Ramos Horta. She stresses that at the time 
when Reinado was in hiding, rumors were circu-
lating about his magical strength: Black Hawks 
shot bullets at him “like rain,” but he remained 
unharmed. Claims were made that magical pro-
tection had allowed him to become invisible, 
thereby tapping into accounts of the resistance 
and the anticolonial struggle. For some, Reinado 
was destabilizing the country. According to oth-
ers, Reinado was the true democrat, associated 
with transparency (Nygaard-Christensen 2012: 
224), someone who fought against dirty state 
politics. h e representation of Reinado (with his 
magical powers) as the true defender of democ-
racy, Nygaard-Christensen (2010: 225) argues, 
reintroduced a spiritual element into seemingly 
secular politics. 
Dystopian fears tend to increase in times of 
conl ict, such as the krise of 2006, in which the 
rebel Reinado was a major i gure. As in other 
nearby conl ict zones—these rumors clearly had 
the potential to amplify existing tensions, as 
shown by Kirsch (2002) in the case of Indonesia-
occupied West Papua. Nils Bubandt (2004) has 
documented Maluku millenarian narratives cir-
culating in 1999 predicting an upcoming battle 
the following year between Christians and Mus-
lims that would lead to a radical transformation 
of the world, which fueled violence between 
them. Similarly, in the 2006 conl ict in Timor-
Leste, rumors that unknown forces were insti-
gating violence ot en created extreme anxiety. 
Emotionally and politically charged rumors 
about invisible sources of power and potency 
continued to circulate across the country for 
years at erwards and periodically led to the erup-
tion of small conl icts between dif erent factions. 
In 2008, Alfredo Reinado was killed by José 
Ramos Horta’s security guard, at er he had 
staged an attack on José Ramos Horta (former 
president of the country and Nobel-peace prize-
winner) near his residence in Dili. h is gave rise 
to yet another range of suspicions. Why was 
Ramos Horta shot and critically injured, while 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão escaped un-
scathed when another party of rebels arrived at 
his house the same day? Was Reinado shot in 
defense or was he, in fact, executed? A range of 
rumors circulated in the weeks at er the event, 
expressing suspicions that the entire attack had 
been a setup, designed to get rid of Reinado. 
Several people told me that they are certain that 
Reinado is actually still alive—hiding, and this 
is interesting considering the signii cance of the 
underground in visions of prosperity—in a hole 
in the ground. 
Suspicions of conspiracies and cover-ups 
more ot en than not spill across national bound-
aries, and conspiracies can be coni rmed by 
facts of history (see, e.g., Jollif e 2001). Wor-
ries that foreigners may come to enrich them-
selves through Timor-Leste’s resources clearly 
have an element of truth to them. Neves (2006) 
has pointed out how billions of US dollars that 
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were invested in postconl ict state building in 
Timor-Leste were in fact spent on the salaries 
of international staf . He shows that interna-
tional staf  working for the UN transitional 
government were paid 20–30 times more than 
their local counterparts, who received less than 
1 percent of the total UNTAET budget (the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor). 
Moreover, in June 2014, US federal agents ar-
rested an American adviser who had defrauded 
the Timor-Leste government of US$3.5 million 
(La’o Hamutuk 2014). 
Accounts of the possibility of sudden wealth 
and fears of its thet  seem to emerge precisely 
at moments when people are confronted with 
outsiders, whose presence is experienced as ex-
plicitly extractive. h e suggestion that foreign-
ers have come to steal gold, oil, or other resources 
rel ects to an extent the actual thet  of natural 
resources from Timor-Leste. Portuguese col-
onizers, whose imperial expansion was partly 
motivated by a quest for gold (Boxer 1969: 164–
167)—itself a utopian vision of prosperity—
participated in the systematic exploitation of 
Timor-Leste’s natural resources, including san-
dalwood. Later, Australian companies repeat-
edly came to the country to survey its natural 
resources (Pélissier 1996: 241; see also McGrath 
2014), while Indonesia bought Australia’s si-
lence concerning the occupation by promising 
Australia access to East Timorese oil resources. 
Independence has been accompanied by an 
economic bubble created by an inl ux of staf  
working for the World Bank, UN, and other aid 
agencies, which led to the construction of ex-
pensive hotels and apartments and large-scale 
migration of the rural population to the cities, 
where youths i nd low-skilled work in construc-
tion and in the service sector, ot en as domestic 
laborers for the aid community. Social inequal-
ities are rising sharply in the country, and the 
economic elite is increasingly estranged from 
the ordinary population. Large churches, gov-
ernment buildings, and foreign embassies have 
sprung up in the capital, while the majority of 
people live in extremely poor conditions. It is 
not surprising that wealthy East Timorese citi-
zens or those in government positions are some-
times referred to as “foreigners” (malae). h e 
stark inequality and dif erence of living stan-
dards does quite understandably raise the ques-
tion whether foreigners somehow proi t from 
Timor-Leste’s wealth. Australia still makes claims 
to oil and gas that, according to international 
maritime law, would belong to Timor-Leste. In 
that sense, the fear that foreigners may come to 
take people’s wealth away seems a legitimate one. 
h is raises the question of whether or not there 
is some truth to at least some of the so-called 
conspiracy theories circulating in the country. 
A qualifying feature of the label “conspiracy 
theory” is the fact that the content of such a the-
ory must by dei nition be untrue. h e label is 
ot en used in a pejorative way to describe what 
are considered to be absurd ideas or theories 
of plots that threaten to destabilize the current 
world order. From the perspective of those us-
ing the label, conspiracy theorists connect un-
related events, suspect implausible sinister plots 
behind the visible world of everyday interac-
tions, or allege cover-ups of illegal activities by 
those in charge; they are, in other words, irra-
tional or fantastical (Pelkmans and Machold 
2011: 74). Conspiratorial allegations are usually 
considered to be false or unproven, because if 
they turned out to be true, they would no longer 
be seen as a conspiracy theory but would sim-
ply count as reality. As Pelkmans and Machold 
(2011: 76-77) have suggested, there is no episte-
mological dif erence between conspiracy theo-
ries and other theories, yet the label “conspiracy 
theory” is ot en a tool used by those in power to 
discredit the critiques of those at the margins. 
In their analysis of conspiracy theories in 
relation to the buzzword of the aid industry 
“transparency,” West and Sanders describe con-
spiracy theories as ideological formations that 
ot en express “suspicion of power,” whether 
from the let  or the right (2003: 3, 15). West and 
Sanders discount the need to evaluate conspir-
acy theories in terms of their truth-value, some-
thing they feel anthropologists still tend to do 
nowadays. But what if conspiracy theories do 
turn out to be true? What if the suspicions about 
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cover-ups, agitation behind the scenes, or illegal 
spying end up being grounded in reality? Can 
we really dismiss the signii cance of the truth-
value of conspiracy theories? h ere are proba-
bly few other places in the world where alleged 
conspiracies have been revealed to be based on 
actual conspiratorial activity as frequently as in 
Timor-Leste. 
On 3 December 2013 the Australian Secu-
rity Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) raided 
the oi  ce of a Canberra-based lawyer, Bernard 
Collaery, who was preparing a case against the 
Australian government on behalf of Timor-
Leste. h e ASIO seized documents that con-
tain information related to the legal battle over 
US$40 billion in oil and gas reserves located in 
the Timor Sea (Lamb 2014; McGrath 2014). 
It had just been revealed that nearly 10 years 
earlier, in 2004, when negotiations were going 
on between both governments, Australian spies 
posing as aid workers had planted recording 
equipment to listen in on the Timor-Leste gov-
ernment. When one of the spies later blew the 
whistle, the Timor-Leste government took Aus-
tralia to the International Court of Justice to 
challenge the treaty that both countries had en-
tered into in 2006. h e so-called Certain Mari-
time Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) 
treaty contained a clause preventing renego-
tiation for 50 years. However the revelation of 
espionage opened the door for Timor-Leste to 
take action to challenge the treaty, which at-
tributed only 50 percent of revenues from the 
Timor Sea of shore oil and gas reserves to Timor-
Leste, with the other 50 percent going to Aus-
tralia, even though the i elds should belong to 
Timor-Leste if the laws of international mari-
time boundaries were applied (McGrath 2014; 
Robie 2014). 
h ese events illustrate, as Pelkmans and Ma-
chold (2011: 68) have argued, that we should 
not dismiss the signii cance of the truth-value of 
conspiracy theories all too quickly. When con-
spiracy theories turn out to be fully or partially 
coni rmed by the facts of history, it provides 
those who hold them with a sense of vindica-
tion. It inl uences the bargaining position of af-
fected parties and thus shapes the i eld of power 
relations within which such theories emerged in 
the i rst place. h e revelations about the Austra-
lian spies made it possible for the Timor-Leste 
government to challenge the maritime agree-
ment that had previously been untouchable due 
to the 50-year nonrenegotiation clause. It seems 
that East Timorese suspicions of Australian 
conspiracies were entirely warranted. Of course, 
this does not mean all conspiratorial suspicions 
voiced in Timor-Leste are true, but it does mean 
that they should not a priori be described as ir-
rational, fantastical, or absurd. 
During my research on petroleum develop-
ment in 2015, a ritual speaker in Suai, the region 
where part of Timor-Leste’s petroleum infra-
structure project is to be built, asserted that he 
possessed documents about an agreement the 
“af ected community” made with the govern-
ment about proi t sharing, but he said that it 
was secret. He told me that if he showed it to 
me, I might tamper with it or steal it; at er all, 
the Australian government had just stolen doc-
uments from the East Timorese government. 
Allusions to the Australian spying scandal were 
ample, and elaborated in much detail during my 
visit to the south coast. Members of the govern-
ment and the oil industry made similar kinds of 
claims, maintaining that they had knowledge of 
a document containing proof that Timor-Leste 
had new yet undiscovered onshore petroleum 
resources, subsequently adding that these doc-
uments had to be kept secret for the time being. 
Conclusion: Cargo and 
conspiracy as critical practice
West and Sanders (2003: 6) have argued that 
conspiracy theories are frequently linked to 
ideas of unseen powers or embedded in “occult 
cosmologies”—something that, in the case of 
Timor-Leste, can equally be said about utopian 
visions. People who make such claims about the 
invisible workings of power ot en also hint at 
the possibility that these unseen powers can be 
manipulated or tapped into. Gold, oil, and lulik 
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are considered to be sources of immeasurable 
wealth and potential—as well as anxiety and 
antagonism. In the collective imagination, the 
properties of oil and gas increasingly come to 
resemble that of lulik powers with its potential 
to usher in change and bring prosperity, while 
also making the country vulnerable to foreign 
exploitation. h e magical potential ascribed to 
the sacred power of the land is transposed onto 
petroleum (cf. Weszkalnys 2014), able to bring 
immense wealth but also conjuring images of 
oil dependency and the resource curse. Fears 
of conspiracy and utopian visions of prosper-
ity therefore present two sides of the same coin 
and are rooted in the notion that power works 
in invisible ways. Whereas conspiracy theories 
claim that others are secretly plotting, some in-
dividuals in Timor-Leste also saw themselves as 
the guardians of a hidden potency, a source they 
actively seek to keep hidden—or only reveal to 
a select number of individuals. 
Presenting themselves as having access to 
secret knowledge or power may be a way of 
countering marginalization and challenging 
political asymmetries. At the national level, the 
politicians involved in the planning of the pe-
troleum infrastructure project are, of course, 
not marginal—they are members of the elite. 
Yet internationally they are faced by a massively 
powerful petroleum industry and are forced to 
negotiate with Australia from very uneven ne-
gotiating positions. In order to make any prog-
ress in negotiations with Australia, they need 
to “play the game” as the minister of petroleum 
and mineral resources (Alfredo Pires) told me 
in an interview—and asserting knowledge over 
hidden riches might be one part of this strat-
egy. Being able to project coni dence in the ex-
istence of great resource wealth is a key aspect 
of “playing the game” as it is a precondition for 
attracting investors. But with rapidly falling 
oil prices, prospects of fueling development in 
Timor-Leste through oil wealth are becoming 
increasingly uncertain. 
h is article has sought to distinguish be-
tween labels and practice. h e use of the labels 
“cargo cult” and “conspiracy theory” has the 
ef ect of creating a divide between supposedly 
rational and irrational people, distinctions that 
are frequently mapped onto colonial distinc-
tions of foreign colonizers versus (post)colonial 
indigenous population. Representing people as 
conspiracy theorists is a way of blocking them 
from making inquiries about foreign inter-
ventions, including spying. Representing state 
planners as cargo cultists may in the end serve 
to undermine their bargaining position in the 
competitive and hard-line oil business. Reyna 
and Behrends (2008: 12) have emphasized that 
discussions about the curse of oil in developing 
petrostates should be investigated in terms of 
“struggles to regulate domination.” h e ripple 
ef ects of oil’s domination globally are visible 
in the fact that in their frustration at their mar-
ginal position internationally, state planners ig-
nore legitimate warnings about the risks of the 
resource curse on their national economy. 
In contrast to labeling, the practices of envi-
sioning prosperity and conspiracy present ways 
of engaging critically with power inequalities: 
by portraying outsiders as ultimately originating 
in Timor-Leste or by identifying Timorese selves 
with the wealth of the outside, these problem-
atic categories are extinguished. h ese visions 
end up collapsing such distinctions by appro-
priating the power of the outside. It is, I would 
argue, part of larger struggles over authority—
both among dif erent political groups inside 
Timor-Leste and of the country’s relationship 
with the outside, such as powerful neighbors 
like Australia. By making references to this hid-
den power, people in Timor-Leste allude to the 
hidden possibilities for action that those at the 
margins possess. Sadly, in the long term, how-
ever, the “outsider focus” of the fantastical de-
velopment schemes the government is planning 
to implement in Oecussi and along the south 
coast (plans that include international airports, 
hotels, and a hospital for medical tourists) is 
more likely to widen the gap between East Ti-
morese citizens and outsiders, as argued con-
vincingly by Meitzner Yoder (2015: 312). 
Even though I would reject the use of the 
term “cargo cult” to describe visions of pros-
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perity in Timor-Leste, there are certain com-
monalities about the ways in which people in 
Timor-Leste and Melanesia have responded to 
drastic historical transformations, including in-
teraction with Europeans, colonial exploitation, 
the introduction of Christianity and the per-
sistence of social inequalities (Robbins 2004). 
In his reassessment of anthropological critiques 
of the notion of cargo cults and millenarianism 
in Melanesia, Joel Robbins (2004: 243) has ar-
gued that millenarian (or cargoistic) practices 
can be “reconi gured as part of a comparative 
anthropology of critical practice.” h is insight 
can be applied to the literature on conspiracy 
theories as well, since such theorizing about 
conspiracies should be seen as a similar form 
of critical practice. By discussing visions of 
prosperity alongside visions of conspiracy, this 
article has tried to further extend this critical 
comparative project—whereas visions of con-
spiracy tend to focus on political inequalities, 
visions of prosperity tend to be critical of eco-
nomic dif erences. Both kinds of visions have a 
“sense-making value” (Pelkmans and Machold 
2011: 77) and aim to make inexplicable dynam-
ics that have led to the unequal distribution of 
power and wealth comprehensible. As such, 
practices of envisioning prosperity and conspir-
acy in Timor-Leste should be seen as forms of 
critical inquiry that challenge both national and 
international power asymmetries. Rather than 
ridiculing such visions, we should take their 
critical potential seriously, so that we can ana-
lyze under what conditions such forms of crit-
ical practice manage to change the relations of 
inequality from which they arise. 
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